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citizens. Insurance companies are sometimes subjected to such conditions, and are required to deposit with some public officer bonds
or stocks to secure the payment of losses. That the state may
impose such conditions is settled by the decisions of the Federal
Supreme Court: Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404;
-Paul v. T irginia, 8 Wall. 168; -Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Id. 410.
And having received the securities it has ample power to provide
for giving remedies to parties for whose protection they are
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The voluntary dismissal of a civil action is primafacie evidence of a want of
probable cause, and casts upon the defendant in an action for malicious prosecution
the burden of showing probable cause.
Although an action is commenced with probable cause, yet if the plaintiff therein
continues to prosecute it, when there is no probable cause, there can be a recovery
against him for a malicious prosecution. Such continued prosecution cannot be for
the purpose of vindicating a right, but to vex, harass and oppress. The fact that
probable cause had ceased to exist must, however, appear otherwise than from the
evidence introduced on the trial.
The advice of counsel, on a full and fair statement of the material facts and information within his knowledge, will not protect a party, unless he acted in good faith
under the advice received, in instituting the suit.
On the issue of probable cause, certain depositions taken in the former suit, tending to show that defendant could have ascertained facts which would have had an
important bearing on such issue, adversely to his right to maintain the prior action,
were offered in evidence by plaintiff and rejected by the court: Held, .that they
should have been admitted.
A point that was not raised in the court below will not be considered on appeal.

from Des Moines Circuit Court.
It is stated in the etition that the defendants commenced'and
prosecuted maliciously and without probable cause a civil action
against the plaintiff; that they caused an attachment to issue in
said action ; but it is not stated that any of plaintiff's property
was attached. It is further stated the action was voluntarily dismissed by the defendants. The plaintiff seeks to recover in this
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action such damages as he sustained by the wrongful commencement
and prosecution of said action, in addition to the taxable costs.
There was a trial by jury on a denial of the allegations of the
petition, judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed.
S. John & Williams, for appellant.
Poor & Baldwin and .Hall&' Huston, for appellees.
SEEVERS, J.-The appellees insist, as it was not stated in
the petition the property of the plaintiff had been seized on the
attachment, and there was no evidence introduced so tending, that
the action will not lie. We do not feel called on to determine this
question, because it was not raised in the circuit court by motion,
demurrer or instruction asked to be given to the jury; nor have
the defendants appealed. The record unmistakably shows the trial
in the circuit court was on the theory that the plaintiff could recover if the allegations in the petition were established by the evidence. The question presented cannot, therefore, be raised for the
first time in this court, as we have uniformly held. The case will
be tried here on the same theory it was in the circuit court, and
what is hereafter said must be so regarded or understood.
In the prior action the plaintiff pleaded a counter-claim and
sought to recover damages on tthe ground it had been commenced
and prosecuted without reasonable and probable cause. The action
was tried before a jury, and before it was submitted the plaintiff
withdrew the counterclaim, and the defendants dismissed their
action. The plaintiff, in this action, asked the court to instruct
the jury as follows: " It being admitted that the suit against
Mr. Wetmore was voluntarily dismissed by the defendants herein,
that is &ima facie evidence of a want of probable cause in commencing the same, and the burden is upon defendants to show the
existence of probable cause before they can rely upon it as a defence
in this action." This instruction was refused. We think it should
have been given. It was held in Burhans V'. Sanford, 19 Wend.
417, that the voluntary dismissal of a civil action cast upon the
defendant in an action for fihalicious prosecution the burden of showing probable cause. To the same effect is Green v. Cochran, 43
Iowa 544; and our attention has not been called to any case in
which the contrary has been held. When a person causes a crim-
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inal prosecution to be commenced he cannot dismiss it. This can
only be done by the proper officers of the government. There is,
therefore, much reason in holding the dismissal of a criminal prosecution should not cast on the defendant in a civil action for malicious prosecution the burden of showing he had probable cause for
commencing the criminal prosecution. But the plaintiff in a civil
action has full control of it and may dismiss it at his pleasure, and
when he does so we are of the opinion it should be regarded as
primafacie evidence that be did not have probable cause for commencing it. If he had, he can as readily so show as for the other
party to show he had not. We do not think the fact a counterclaim had been pleaded is material ; for, notwithstanding this fact,
the defendants had full control of their action and could dismiss it
at any time. Besides this, the counter-claim had been withdrawn
when the action was dismissed. The instructions of the court
inconsistent with these views are erroneous.
In stating the issues to the jury the court said: "The only
questions for your determination are-st. Did defendants commence
said suit without probable cause ? 2d. Did they also commence it
maliciously ? 3d. If they did commence said suitwithout probable
cause, and maliciously, was the plaintiff damaged thereby ?" The
appellant insists the court should have submitted to the jury the
question whether the suit was prosecuted without probable cause,
although there was such cause for its commencement; the claim
being, if a party continues to prosecute a civil action after he has
become satisfied there is no probable cause for its further prosecution, or when under the circumstances, as a reasonably cautious and
prudent person, he should have become so satisfied, then such continued prosecution renders him liable in an action for malicious
prosecution. Upon principle we think this must be so. If an
action is commenced without probable cause, an action for malicious
prosecution can be maintained. Although commenced with probable
cause it seems to us to necessarily follow that if it is prosecuted
when there is no probable cause there can be a recovery. Such
continued prosecution cannot be for the purpose of vindicating a
right, but to vex, harass and oppress. If there was probable cause
the right to bring the action existed; but when such cause ceased,
and there was a bad motive for its continuance, then from such time
the party became a wrongdoer. In principle we do not think such
a case differs materially from that when a party rightfully enters
VOL. XXXI.-90
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on real estate and afterwards becomes a wrongdoer: Cooley on
Torts 316.
Whether the court erred in the particulars named depends on
the question whether there was evidence tending to show the defendants believed, or had reasonable grounds to believe, there was 2
no probable cause for the continued prosecution before it was dismissed. We have not read the evidence with the care required
to determine this question, because we do not deem it necessary to
do so. There must be a reversal on other grounds, and when tried
again the evidence may not be the same. In view of such trial we,
however, deem it proper to say that we do not think a plaintiff is
bound to dismiss an action, or that he can be held liable in an action for malicious prosecution, if he does not do so when the evidince adduced on the trial sufficiently shows there is no probable
cause for its further prosecution. 'In the first place, a party has
the right to take the chances of a verdict in his favor; and in the
second place a party cannot, during the excitement of the trial, be
expected to give the matter the requisite thought and attention.
The fact, therefore, that probable cause had ceased to
exist, must otherwise appear than from the evidence introduced on
I
the trial.
The plaintiff asked an instruction in relation to the advice of
counsel. This instruction was refused, and the court gave the
jury what was deemed the correct rule in the eleventh paragraph
of the charge. The only difference between the two, which we can
discover, is that the instruction asked states the rule to be that the
advice of counsel, on a full and fair statement of the material facts
and information within their -knowledge, will not protect them,
"unless they acted in good faith under the advice received." The
sentence quoted is omitted from the charge of the court.
In Centre v. Spring, 2 Iowa 393, it was said: " If he does not
himself believe that there is cause for the prosecution or action
* * * he will not be protected." We think this is the correct
rule, briefly stated, and therefore the court erred in refusing the
instruction asked. Whether the defendants stated to counsel all
the material facts and information within their knowledge, was a
question for the jury.
A person claiming to be Elias V. Baker came to the defendants' place of business in Burlington, Iowa, and induced them to
purchase of him a tract of land in Poweshiek county. A convey-
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ance was executed in the name of Baker and wife, and a part of the
consideration was paid. The abstract of the records, and the
records of Poweshiek county, show the title to be in Baker. It
turned out the conveyance to Baker ,was a forgery. The defendants
made efforts to find Baker, and failing to do so came to the conclusion the name had been assumed for swindling purposes. During
the search they learned the plaintiff resided in Guthrie county, and,
for reasons satisfactory to themselves, went to see him, and claimed
to have recognised him to be the man Baker, and brought the
civil action against him to recover the money paid in consideration
for the land. In that action the present plaintiff took certain depositions in Yankton, which tend to show the plaintiff could not
have been in Burlington at the time of the purchase and conveyance of the land. The depositions were offered in evidence in this
case by the plaintiff, and the defendants objected thereto on the
grounds the same were immaterial, incompetent and irrelevant.
The objection was sustained and the depositions excluded.
The plaintiff gave evidence tending to show that before the
defendants brought the action they were informed by one Arnold
the plaintiff had resided at Yankton, and had been somewhat prominent at that place, and he advised defendants to make inquiries
there before commencing the action. This they failed to do. The
principal issue in the present action was whether the defendant
had probable cause for commencing the prior action. Now it was
for the- jury to say whether, under the circumstances, the defendants should have made inquiry at Yankton before commencing their
action, and whether, if they had done so, they would probably have
ascertained facts which would have an important bearing on the
question of probable cause. For this purpose only we think the
depositions were admissible, and therefore the court erred in
excluding them.
Objections are urged to the rulings of the court in receiving
and rejecting other evidence. We do not deem it necessary to
extend this opinion by entering on a description of such questions;
deeming it sufficient to say we are not satisfied the errors assigned,
relating to such objections, are well taken.
Reversed.
The point decided in this case that the
continued prosecution with malice of an
action commenced with probable cause,

after the plaintiff therein has discovered
that there exists no probable cause therefor, renders the plaintiff liable in an ac-
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tion for a malicious prosecution, is, so far
as we can learn, one of first impression
in this country.
The only cases bearing upon the question that we have been able to find are
the English cases of Weston v. Beernan
et al., 27 L. J. (Ex.) 57, and Fltzjohn
v. fackinder, 30 L. J. (C. P.) 257,
264.
In Ktzjobn v. 1ackinder, in the Exchequer Chamber, upon appeal from the
Court of Common Pleas, the defendant,
in answer to a set-off by the plaintiff to
the defendant's suit in a county court,
produced an acknowledgment purporting
to have been signed by the plaintiff that
the set-off had been settled. The defendant knowingly and falsely swore that the
signature to the paper was made by the
plaintiff in his presence. The plaintiff
swore it was not his signature. The county
court judge, partly in consequence of the
defendant's evidence and partly because
the plaintiff's evidence was unsatisfactory
in other matters, believed the defendant,
disbelieved the plaintiff and directed the
defendant to be bound over to prosecute
the plaintiff for perjury. The defendant, in consequence, preferred an indictment against the plaintiff for perjury at
the assizes; the plaintiff was acquitted: Held, by COcRBUnE, C. J., BnANwELL, B., and CHANNELL, B. (WIGHTMAN, J., and BLACrauIw, J., dissenting), that the plaintiff might, on these
facts, maintain an action against the defendant for maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause causing the
defendant to be indicted for perjury, and
prosecuted on such indictment. In rendering his opinion, lBAnnwuLn, B.,
said': "Had the action been for damages
in respect of the preferring of the indictment only, and had the grand jury
thrown the bill out, I think the action
would not have been maintainable.
Though the charge against the plaintiff
was false, as must now be assumed, I
think the defendant was bound to prefer
the indictment. * * * But this action is

not for damages in respect of the preferring of the indictment only, but also for
the residue of the prosecution and the
damage consequent on it. It must be
assumed that the defendant laid a case
before the grand jury false to his own
knowledge, which caused them to find
a true bill. For this, I think an action maintainable-why not? Where
an action is maintainable in respect of
the whole prosecution, including the preferring of the bill, it is part maintainable
for the subsequent stages and conduct of
it; then, why should it not be maintainable for the parts, even where it is not
for the mere preferring of the bill ? * **
I think that though the defendant was
bound to prefer the indictment, he was
not bound, but the contrary, to procure
its being found by the means he must
have used; that, consequently, as to that
part of the case, the order to prosecute
does not protect him ; that his action was
malicious, viz., to avoid having to recant
and confess that he had sworn falsely,
and sothe action lies." Cocxunn, C. J.:
" I am not prepared to say that so much
of the declaration as charges the defendant with having maliciously procured the
order of the county court can be sustained, as it must be taken that the purpose of the defendant's perjury was not
to cause the plaintiff to be prosecuted,
but simply to defeat the suit. But it
appears to me that the action may be well
maintained as to so much as charges the
defendant with having maliciously and
without probable cause preferred an indictment against the plaintiff, and prosecuted such indictment.' * * * In my
opinion a prosecution, though in the outset not malicious, as having been undertaken at the dictation of a judge or magistrate, or if spontaneous from having
been commenced under a bona fide belief in the guilt of the accused may,
nevertheless, become malicious in any of
the stages through which it has to pass,
if the prosecution, having acquired positive knowledge of the innocence of the
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accused, perseveres alo anlrno in the prosecution with the intention of procuring
per nefas a conviction of the accused."
In Weston v. Beernan etat, supra, the
plaintiff, a farmer, had assigned to the
defendants, as security for money advanced, all his stock, &c.,with power to
seize the stock and sell the same, and the
party put in possession under the bill of
sale had issued a summons against the
assignor for feloniously stealing some of
the chattels assigned, and the assignees
who resided at a distance and had until
then known nothing of the matter, attended the hearing of the summons which
was dismissed; but there was no evidence as to what passed at the hearing,
except that the case was stated in the
presence of the defendants and on their
behalf as prosecutors: Held, that upon
the admitted facts the plaintiff had failed
to prove the absence of reasonable and
probable cause, and, therefore, that the
defendant was entitled to a verdict in his
favor. The court appear to have considered that there was a material distinction, as to liability for malicious prosecution, between the institution of the prosecution and its continuance after it had
been already instituted without authority
by the agent, and that the absence of reasonable and probable cause, which might
be evidence of malice in one case, was
not so in the other. POLLOCK, 0. B. :
"It may perhaps be laid down generally
that when a charge is made which with
the least inquiry would appear to be
groundless, there is not reasonable cause,
and the jury might think that evidence
of malice, but here the proceedings
merely went to a hearing in the defendI,

ants' presence, and they were hardly
bound to stop them before they heard the
sworn evidence. * * r There is no
doubt a material distinction between instituting a prosecution and merely attending the hearing upon a proceeding already
commenced. * * * The defendants are
only responsible for what they did or
authorized to be done, not for the whole
proceeding."
BaniwELI, B.: "The
defendants could not be responsible for
the prosecution, except on the suppositior
of such an utter absence of reasonable
cause as would show malice. Now the
proceedings were not commenced by
them, but only continued ; and their responsibility commences at the point at
which they became cognisant of the proceedings. Was there, then, an utter absence of reasonable and probable cause ?
* ** The defendants attended the hearing, that was all. * * * If they had
said, before they heard a word of evidence, 'we disavow the proceeding,'
that surely would have been acting unreasonably, for it would have been acting
precipitately before they knew anything
about the matter. I think, therefore,
that there was not evidence of an absence
of reasonable cause for the defendants '
share in the matter."
From these cases, as well as upon
principle, we think it must be apparent
that the decision in the principal case of
the point stated at the beginning of this
note, is in every respect correct; and
upon the whole the entire case is well
considered and satisfactory. MAssnnL D. EwniL.
Chicago.
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Supreme Court of California,
CANAVAN v. GRAY.
Where a statute gives to a person unlawfully in possession a right of action for a
forcible entry by the true owner, that remedy is exclusive and he cannot naintain
trespass for damages caused by such entry.

APPEAL from Superior Court, San Francisco, in an action of
trespass in which the following facts appeared:
On the 19th day of August 1875, James Canavan, who was then
the husband of the plaintiff, was the lessee and in the possession
of the fifty-vara lot on the south-east corner of Third and 3rannan
streets, in San Francisco, and was the. owner of all the frame
buildings thereon ; and on that day he assigned said lease and sold
said buildings to the defendant H. W. Gray. On the same day he
signed and delivered to said Gray an instrument in writing, of
which the following is a copy: "This is to certify that I have
rented four rooms, upper story, S. E. cor. Third and Brannan sts.,
at ($20) twenty dollars per month; and I hereby agree to deliver
up possession of the said rooms upon receipt of ten days' notice,
said notice to take effect from 13th day of August 1875."
On the 26th of September 1875, said Gray commenced an action
against said James Canavan for the possession of said premises, and
on the 27th of the said month the latter went away, leaving his
family, including his wife, the plaintiff" herein, in said rooms. He
has never occupied said rooms since. But the plaintiff has continued to occupy them without paying any rent for the use and
occupation thereof.
On the 5th day of April 1879, some persons who had been
employed by said Gray for that purpose, unroofed the house containing said rooms, and by so doing damaged the personal property
of the plaintiff therein, and this action was brought to recover the
damages which the plaintiff thereby sustained. Upon these aad
other facts, which do not change the legal aspect of the case, a
verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for $1000. A motion
for a new trial was made by the defendants, and denied by the
court, on condition that the plaintiff should remit $250 of the
damages, which she did. From that order and the judgment
defendant appealed.
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William Reid, for appellants.
f.

. ffassett, for respondents.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHARPSTEIN, J.-The vital question is, can the plaintiff, upon
these facts, maintain an action of trespass against the defendant ?
Upon that question the cases are conflicting, and we shall not
attempt to enumerate them on the one side or the other, but will
briefly examine the grounds upon which the opinions pro and con
are based.
All agree that at common law the plaintiff could not, upon the
facts disclosed by this record, maintain any action whatever against
the defendants. It is also conceded that the only change which
has been made in the law relating to this subject is that made by
the statute which, in this state, as in many others, provides a summary remedy for forcible entry upon or into any real property. It
is only as. to the extent of the change wrought by this statute that
there is any difference of opinion. The insistence on one side is
that- "the statute of forcible entry and detainer, not in terms, but
by necessary construction, forbids a forcible entry, even by the
owner, upon the actual possession of another. Such entry is therefore unlawful. If unlawful it is a trespass, and an action for the
trespass must necessarily lie :" Beeder v. Purdy, 41 Ill. 279.
On the other side it is urged that the remedy given by the
statute is exclusive. In this state the plaintiff in an action of
forcible entry may recover the damages occasioned thereby, together
with a judgment for the restitution of the premises. The rule of
the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be
strictly construed has no application to the Code of Civil Procedure,
but it establishes the law of this state respecting the subjects to
which it relates, and its provisions and all proceedings under it are
to be liberally construed, with a view to effect its' objects and to
promote justice: C. C. P. 4. An action of forcible entry would
be a proceeding under the Code, and its provisions relating to that
subject, in such a proceeding, would have to be liberally construed.
But the Code has established the law of. this state respecting that
sdibject. It has provided a remedy and prescribed a course of procedure in cases of forcible entry. And all statutes, laws or rules
on that subject heretofore in force in this state, whether consistent
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or not with the provisions of the Code on the same subject, are
repealed and abrogated: Id. 18.
It is doubtless the duty of courts in actions of forcible entry to
construe the provisions of the Code relating to that subject so as
to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy-that is, the
remedy given by the statute. The legislature has provided a remedy
for forcible entry, no matter by whom made. But it has provided
only one remedy. Before there was any legislation on the subject
a person in the actual rightful or wrongful possession of real estate
could maintain trespass against any one, not having a right to enter,
for a forcible entry upon it. A person in the wrongful possession
could not maintain an action against the owner, having a right to
enter, for a forcible entry. But the statute gives a person, even
in the wrongful possession, a right of action, and prescribes its
form, against the owner having a right to enter, if he make a
forcible entry. Neither expressly nor by necessary implication
does the statute give to a person in the wrongful possession the
right to maintain any other than the action of forcible entry when
such entry is made by the owner, having the right to enter. The
legislature has provided a particular remedy for a forcible entry
made under such circumstances, but we are unable to see upon what
principle it can be held that another and different remedy, and one
which did not exist at common law, and is not given by statute, is
equally available in such a case.
That the legislature, by giving a person in the wrongful possession of the real estate of another the right to bring an action of
forcible entry against him for entering forcibly upon that which he
had a right to enter upon, impliedly gives a right to maintain trespass in such a case, is at best a very doubtful implication, and the
rules of the common law are not to be changed by doubtful implication. Wilbur v. Crane, 13 Pick. 284.
As the evidence shows that the premises upon which the alleged
trespasses were committed were owned by the defendant, H. W.
Gray, and that he was entitled to the immediate possession of the
same, and that the plaintiff was in the wrongful possession thereof,
the defendant's motion for a new trial should have been granted, on
the ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict.
The case was tried upon what we deem to be an erroneous theory,
and the errors committed by the court in the course of the trial are
attributable to that fact. If the theory upon which the case was
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tried had been the correct one, none of the exceptions could be
sustained. It is, therefore, unnecessary to dwell further upon them.
Judgment and order reversed.
The reasoning of the court in the
principal case is clear and concise, "The
legislature has provided a remedy for forcible entry, no matter by whom made.
But it has provided only one remedy,"
and " we are unable to see upon what
principle it can be held that another and
different remedy, and one which did not
exist at common law, and is not given
by statute, is equally available in such a
cae."I
The right of one actually in possession
of land to redress for being turned out
of the same, and for injuries received in
resisting an attempt on the part of the
rightful owner to regain possession, has
been the subject of numerous decisions
both in England and the United States.
Some confusion has arisen in the law
from the difierent views taken of the action of trespass and the count for violence
usually inserted in the declaration.
While an action of trespass quare clausum, 6c., lies under certain circumstances for an eviction, the force and violence
ta the person has been regarded either as
a matter of aggravation, as in Davison
v. Wilson, 11 A. & E. (N. S.) 890, ora
distinct tort, as in Newton v. Harland, I
I. &-G. 644.
In England, it was undoubtedly the
law that a party in Tpossession might
maintain that possession, no matter how
obtained, against any but the rightful
owner, but that such owner could enter
on his land at all times. The result of
these principles was seen in the conduct
of the owners of land who in the language of the statute 5 Ric. II., sect. I,
cap. 8, made entry with strong hand or
with multitude of people. The above
statute was accordingly passed to remedy
this evil, and it enacts that none from
henceforth make any entry into any lands
or tenements, but in case where entry is
VOL. XXXI.-91

given by law, and in such case not with
strong hand nor withmultitude of people,
but only in peaceable and easy manner,
and if any man from henceforth do to the
contrary and be thereof duly convicted,
he shall be punished by imprisonment,
&c. This statute was followed by 15
Rie. II., cap. 11, 8 H. VI., cap. 9,
which gave restitution to the party dispossessed. 31 Eliz., cap. 11, and 21
Jac. I, cap. 15, which gave restitution
upon inquest found to tenants for years.
All of these statutes impose a penalty
upon persons guilty of the offences
therein described (1 Hawk. P. C. 280),
but provide no civil remedy for the party
dispossessed except restitution after inquest found, or upon conviction of the
forcible entry and detainer, and then only
to parties having a right, as tenants of
the freehold or tenants for years. Where a
landlord therefore entered and ousted a
tenant who overheld, ierumtenemetum,
was held to be a good plea in an action
of trespass quare clausum: Taylor v. Cole,
3 T. R. 292 ; Taunton v. Costar, 7 Id.
431. This last has always been considered as a leading case ; in it KENow, J.,
uses the following language: "The case
is too plain for argument. Here is a
tenant from year to year whose term has
expired upon a proper notice to quit, and
because he holds over in defiance of law
and justice, he now attempts to convert
the lawful entry of his landlord into a
trespass. If ai action of trespass had
been brought it is clear that the landlord
could have justified under a plea of liberum tenementum.'
Turner v. Meymott, 1 Bing. 158, goes
a step further ; the court in that case say
that if the landlord use force in ousting
his tenant, that is an offence against the
public for which he may be indicted, but
is no ground for an action of trespass.
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The landlord once in possession, no matter how gained, could maintain trespass:
Butcher v. Butcher, 7 B. & C. 399.
The right of the landlord to use force
in obtaining possession was first expressly
denied in Hilary v. Gay, 6 0. & 1P.284.
The facts in that case were as follows :
The defendant, the landlord, after geting the plaintiff away procured a number of men who entered plaintiff's room
and turned his wife into the street. Lord
LTxjxnuas-r says, "1Even if plaintiff had
promised to go away, I am of opinion
that the conduct of the defendant cannot
be justified. If the defendant had a
right to the possession he should have
obtained that possession by legal means.'"
In Newton v. Harland,1 M. & G. 644,
a case which was three times tried and
argued very fully, the majority of the
court, Piaxn and ALDsnsoN dissenting,
held that defendant having entered by
forcq and turned out plaintiff's wife and
family, and in so doing assaulted the wife,
could not justify the acts done in defence
of his possession of the house, because

was necessary. In Beddall v. Maitland,
17 Ch. D. 174, the court reviews these
cases, and reconciling the difference, slays
down as the principle enunciated by
Newton v. Harland, 1st. That in respect
of a claim for forcible entry and eviction
a plaintiff cannot recover; but 2d. That
whenever, in course of a forcible entry
there has been committed by the person
who has forcibly entered an independent
wrong, some act which could have been
justified only if he was in lawful possession, the landlord is liable for such act in

damages. The facts in Beddall v. faitland afford an excellent illustration of
the above distinction. The defendant
was in possession of the house under a
license from the owner, which had been
revoked ; plaintiff made a forcible entry
under the statute 5 Ric. II., and defendant made two counterclaims, one for the
forcible entry and eviction, the other for
injury done to his furniture, which had
been thrown into the street. The first
claim was not allowed, but in respect to
his claim for the injury done his furniture
the entry was unlawful. rARiE, B.,
it was held he might recover.
expresses his disapproval of this doctrine
This may be taken as the result of the
in Harvey v. Brydges, 14 Al. & W. 437; English authorities that there is no civil
as follows: "The next point was raised remedy given by statute save restitution
in Newton v. Harland, and if it were upon inquest found, and that to a persdn
necessary to decide it I should have no having a title to the land. That an
hesitation in saying that where a breach action of trespass cannot be maintained
of the peace is committed by a freeholder for the eviction, even if accompanied by
who, in order to get possession of his force, but that recovery may be had in
land, assaults a person wrongfully in pos- such case for injuries done to the person
session of it, against his will, although of the tenant holding over or his personal
the freeholder may be responsible to the property by the landlord, when, as FRY,
public, in the shape of an indictment, he J., says, in Beddall v. Maitland, the act
is not liable to the other party." Harvey could be justified only if the landlord was
v. Brydges, is followed in Lows v. Tel- in lawful possession.
ford, 1 App. Cas. 425, while Newton v.
In this country the necessity of providHarlandis questioned in Davis v. Bur- ing a civil remedy for those who have been
rell, 10 0. B. 821. In Pollen v. Brewer, turned out of possession by the forcible
7 0. B. (N. S.) 371, it is held that no entry of another has been realized by
damages can be recovered for the eviction many of the states, and acts have been
itself, while Davison v. Wilson, 11 A. & passed at different times by the majority
E. (N. S.) 890, decides that a landlord of them with that end in view; some
could justify on a plea of liberum tene- states, however, have either simply re
saentum, unless more force was used than tained the English statutes above men-
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tioned, o. zombined them into one, as in
Pennsylvania (Acts of 1860, Pamph. L.
390). While the effect of a statute giving a civil remedy has modified the doctrine of the English law considerably,
many cases have arisen presenting the
same questions as those already mentioned. This has taken place either iu
some state which had not passed an act
giving a civil remedy for a forcible entry,
or where the plaintiff, ignoring such
remedy, has sought to recover in trespass
for the eviction and injuries accompanying it.
A brief review of the cases will show
how nearly the American decisions accord with the law as laid down in Beddall
v. Mlaitland.
The leading cases are Wilde v. Cantillon,
1 Johns. Cas. 123, and yatt v. IVood, 4
Johns. Rep. 150. The facts in this last
much cited case were as follows: Plaintiff was in possession under an agreement to vacate, and the time had expired.
Defendant, the owner, came on the land,
where plaintiff was mowing the grass,
ordered him to leave the premises and
struck him with a whip. The court in
their decision says, "If the entry in such
case be with a strong hand or a multitude
of people it is an offence for which the
party entering must answer criminally,
but it would be an absurdity to say that
he must also be responsible in damages
for an injury to the person who has no
right, but is himself a wrongdoer in consequence of his illegal entry."
This case
has always been followed in New York:
Ives v. Ives, 13 Johns. 235 ; Jackson v.
MNorse, 16 Id. 197 ; Willard v. Warren,
17 Wend. 758 ; and as late as the case
of Bliss v. Johnson, 73 N. Y. 529, its
doctrine is cited with approval.
That was a' case where defendants
offered to prove that they owned a c rtain strip of land on the highway; plaintiff cut grass on it, left it to dry, and
defendant coming on the land took away
the hay; plaintiff attempted to resist and
a scuffle ensued. The court say, " upon

the assumption that he held the title, defendant had a right at any time to enter
on the highway, take possession of the
hay and appropriate it to his ofn use,
and an action of trespass would not lie
against him, although the entry was by
force, citing Hyatt v. Wood. This case is
important as showing that the doctrine
of Hyatt v. Wood is not shaken by the
adverse criticisms in the Vermont and
Illinois cases.
This case has been generally followed
in the other states: Broun v. Carn, 1
N. H. 169 ; Sterling v. Warden, 51 Id.
219 ; 52 Id. 197 ; Meader v. Stone, 7
Met. 147 ; Com. v. Haley, 4 Allen 318;
Miner v. Stevens, 1 Cush. 485 ; Clark v.
Keliher, 107 Mass. 406 ; Overdier v.
Lewois, 1 W. & S. 90 ; 2,uldrow v. Jones,
1 Rice 64 ; Johnson v. Hannahan, I Strobhart 313; Tribble v. ll'ame, 7 J. J.
Marsh. 599. And although it is doubted
in Larkia v. Avery, 23 Conn. 304, the
latter case did not turn on that point;
and in the case of Bliss v. Bange, 6
Conn. 78, cited as an authority, DAGGET,
J., says, "The (Connecticut) statute
gives the action of trespass in so many
words to the party aggrieved, and the
party aggrieved is by irresistible implication the person forcibly ejected.
But the distinction taken in Newton v.
Harland,as explained in Beddallv. Maitland, seems to have obtained in most of
the American decisions. Thus in Sainpson v. Henry, 13 Pick. 36, "The next
question is whether the facts proved
amount to a defence for the personal injury complained of. It has been argued
that this is only a matter of aggravation,
but we consider it a distinct injury:
Overdier v. Lewis, supra . People v. Hield,
52 Barb. 198.
In most of the cases the converse of
the proposition is stated, viz. : That a
landlord must not use more force than is
necessary: W~inter v. Stevens, 9 Allen
526 ; Pratt v. Farrar,10 Id. 519 ; Sterling v. Warden, 51 N. H. 219 ; Clark
v. Keliher, 107 Mass. 406 ; Flaherty v.
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Andrews, 2 E. D. Sm. 529.

Although
court rely on Newton v. Harlandas sancin some cases it is said that the gist
tioning ths correctness of their view of
of the action is injury to the posses- the force of the statute
: Farwell v. Warsion of the real estate, and the alleged ren, 51 Ill. 467.
trespass on the person is only matter of
In Pennsylvania, in Adams v. Adams,
aggravation: Aferriam v. Willis, 10 7 Phil. 160, Judge STROUD
appears to
Allen 118,which is the doctrine of Taylor think that Overdier v. Lewis might have
v. Cole, supra.
been differently decided if the decision in
With the exceptions to be mentioned
Newton v. Harlandhad been known, but
below, the cases in this country where the the later cases in other
states do not
landlord has entered peaceably and being
seem to have greatly varied from the law
in possession either turns the tenant out by
as laid down in Hyatt v. Wood, supra.
force or uses sufficient force to prevent a
In California, the earlier cases seem to
re-entry, hold that at common law the tenregard the civil remedy provided by the
ant has no redress, and that the statutes statute
as exclusive. Thus in House v.
give no Yemedy unless the force as above
Keiser, 8 Cal. 499, it is said to be in
stated is unreasonable : .Mussey v. Scott,
derogation of the common law and a
32 Vt. 82; Clark v. Keliher, 107 Mass. party
must bring himself clearly within
406; Sterling v. Adams; Tribble v.
its requirements: Opera House v. Bert,
Frame, 7 3. J. Marsh 599.
52 Cal. 471 ; Hemstreet v. Wassum, 49
When the landlord is in possession he Id. 273.
may bring trespass against his former tenIn Missouri, Fuhr v. Dean, 26 Mo.
ant: M3ussey v. Scott, supra;may oust such
116, which follows Krevett v. M-eyer, 24
tenant upon his attempting to regain
Id. 107, while asserting the doctrine of
possession: Dennis v. Wood, 48 Cal. 361 ;
Wilde v. Cantillon, and Taunton v. Cosor may bring a complaint under the stat- tar,supra, that the common law affords no
ute: Sage v. Harpending, 49 Barb.
civil remedy, holds that the injured party
166.
must appeal to the statutory remedy :
The cases which have excited most dis- Fletcher v. Keyte, 66 Mo. 218.
In
cussion are those where the landlord, in
Schaumaffel v. Belm, 77 Ill.
567, it is
regaining possession, used force or used
said that the act of forcible entry and
great violence in ousting the tenant.
detainer being in derogation of the comThe case of Dustin v. Cowdry, 23 Vt. mon law must be strictly construed. With
635, is one of the latter. Therethe land- the exception of the Vermont and Illilord having entered peaceably turned the nois cases above cited (Dustin v. Cowdry,
tenant out forcibly into the street in the Reeder v. Pardy, Whitaker v. Perry, and
winter. Reeder v. Purdy, 41 Ill. 279
Farwell v. Warren), the law in America,
(6 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 104), where as well as in England, seems to be well
the landlord seized plaintiff's wife by the settled as regards the rights of tenants
wrists and turned her out and put the
holding over.
furniture out in the street. o The court
,An interesting discussion of these last
relying on Dustin v. Cowdry, held that
named cases is to be found in the 4 Am.
an action of trespass would lie, although
Law Rev. 429, but at that time the case
in both cases there was a statutory rem- of Beddall v. Maitlandhad not been deedy, on the ground that the statute having
cided, and the writer treats the doctrine
forbidden a forcible entry (which they of Newton v. Harland as entirely exheld this to be), such entry is unlawful.
ploded.
If unlawful, it is a trespass and an acThe result of the American decisions
tion will lie. These cases are approved
seems to be that where a statutory civil
in Whittakerv. Perry, 38 Vt. 107, and the remedy is given the complainant must
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bring himself within the requirements of
the statute and pursue that remedy: that
where such remedy is not given no action
of trespass will lie for an eviction of a
tenant holding over, although necessary
force is used. That if the landlord used
violence in gaining possession or ousts

,he tenant at sufferance with unnecessary

force an action of trespass will lie. And
that for the injuries inflicted on the person of the tenant, and damage done to
his personal property a landlord is responsible. This is in harmony with the law
as laid down in the later English cases.
W. DRAYTON.
Philadelphia.

Circuit Court, Southern District of Ohio.
McCOY v. C., I., ST. L. & 0. RAILROAD COMPANY.
Railroad corporations are quasi public corporations, dedicated to the public use.
In accepting their charters they necessarily accept them with all the duties and
liabilities imposed upon them by law. Thus a quasi public trust is created which
clothes the public with an interest in the use of railroads, and the latter can be controlled by the courts to the extent of the interest of the public therein.
In the absence of some statute providing another and different remedy, courts of
equity have jurisdiction to compel railroad corporations to discharge the duties
imposed upon them by law; and persons injured by the wrongful action or nonaction of such corporations may seek redress by injunction, and are not bound to
resort to proceedings in mandamus or to an action at law for damages.
A railroad company cannot bind itself to deliver to a particular stock-yard all live
stock coming over its line to a certain point, but it is bound to transport over its
road and deliver to all stock-yards at such point, reached by its tracks or connections,
all live stock consigned, or which the shippers desire to consign to them, upon the
same terms and in the same manner as under like conditions it transports and
delivers to their competitors ; and the performance of this duty may be compelled
by injunction at the suit of the proprietor of the stock-yards discriminated against.
Where foreign corporations engage in business in a state whose laws provide that
they may be summoned by process served upon an agent in charge thereof, they are
" found" in the district in which such agent is doing business, within the meaning
of the act of Congress of March 3d 1875 (18 St. at Large, 470), and may be served
in that manner in suits brought in the United States courts.

IN EQUITY.

Motion for preliminary injunction.

Bamsey & f]latthews, for complainant.

ifoadley, Johnson & Colston, for defendant, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, St. Louis & Chicago Railroad Company.
Paxton &. Warrington and Stallo, Kittredge &. Shoemaker, for
defendant, United Railroads Stock-Yards Company.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
BAXTER, C. J.-The facts in this case are few and simple. After

averring that he is a citizen of Kentucky, and that the United
Railroads Stock-Yards Company is an Ohio corporation, and that
the defendant, the Cincinnati, Indianapolis, St. Louis and Chicago
Railroad Company, is a corporation organized under the laws of

Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, the complainant charges that he is
lessee of certain stock-yards, referred to in his bill, situated on the
line of the Cincinnati & Baltimore Railroad Company's road, in
Hamilton county, Ohio; that his yards are connected with said
railroad by a suitable switch; that he is there engaged in the business of receiving, feeding, housing and shipping live stock; that
the Cincinnati, Indianapolis, St. Louis & Chicago Railroad Company's road connects with the Cincinnati & Baltimore Company's
road two miles south of complainant's yards ; and that the said
defendant is, by contract, in the use of that portion of said Cincinnati & Baltimore Railroad Company's road lying between said point
of junction and complainant's yards, over which it is carrying on
the business of a common carrier of live stock, making regular
deliveries to and receiving stock from, its co-defendant, loaded
in cars standing on the track. He furthermore alleges such receipt
and delivery of stock in cars on the track is necessary to the successful prosecution of his business, but that, in disregard of the
obligations imposed on it by law, said defendant has entered into a
contract with the United Railroads Stock-Yards Company, its codefendant, whereby it has covenanted to make said United Railroads
Stock-Yards Company's yards its depot for the receipt and delivery
of all live stock carried by it to and from Cincinnati, and obliged
itself, in so far as it could lawfully do so, to deliver all live stock
carried by it to, or received for shipment from Cincinnati to and
from its co-defendant, and that, relying on said contract as a valid
obligation and a sufficient justification of its action in the premises
said defendant unlawfully and wrongfully refuses to receive stock
from, or deliver stock to complainant, except through the United
Railroads Stock-Yards 'Company's yard, whose yards, it appears,
adjoin the complainant's yards.
Complainant thereupon prays for an injunction to restrain said
defendant from so discriminating against it, and to compel it to
receive and make deliveries of stock to him in the same manner and
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on as favorable terms as it receives from and delivers to complainant's said competitor.
The application for a preliminary injunction came on for argument before me at Knoxville on the twelfth of July 1882, when the
Cincinnati, Indianapolis, St. Louis & Chicago Railroad Company
filed its plea denying the jurisdiction of this court, because, as the
plea avers, it is not a corporation of Ohio, as it alleged, but that it
is a corporation under and in virtue of the laws of the state of
Indiana alone. It does not, by its plea, deny service of process or
raise any question in regard to its regularity or legal sufficiency.
But the counsel insisted in argument that as defendant was an
Indiana corporation, and a citizen of that state, it could not be lawfully served with process in this jurisdiction, and that it was, therefore, not legitimately before the court.
We need not stop to demonstrate that the question argued by
counsel is broader than the plea, inasmuch as if such question was
raised by the plea I would not hesitate to overrule it.
We concede that corporations-mere legal entities-can only
legally exist within the territorial limits of the sovereignty creating
them; that they must dwell in the places of their creation, and can
not migrate to other sovereignties. But it is as equally well settled
that they can do business, if not inhibited by law from so doing, in
foreign states and countries, and that they may be there sued in
relation to the same: 1 Redfield Railways, p. 63, § 4.
Hence, if it were conceded that the defendant is an Indiana corporation, as alleged in its plea, it appears that it owns and operates
a railroad in Ohio, where its president resides and its principal
office is located, and that it is there, by legislative permission,
engaged in the business of a railroad carrier. If so, it is liable to
be served with process in this jurisdiction. "This court," says
Judge FoRCE, of the Superior Court of Cincinnati, in a case recently
decided by him, "has, by statute, jurisdiction of an action against
a foreign corporation when such corporation can be found within
the city. A corporation can be found where it can be served with
a process according to law. A loreign corporation can be served
with a summons according to law (in Ohio) by service upon a managing agent." And about the same time Mr. Justice MATTHEWS
said, in a similar case, pending in this court, that "where foreign
corporations establish an agency in a state whose laws provide (as
in this) that they may be summoned by process served upon an
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agent, they are 'found' within the district in which such agent is
doing business, within the meaning of the act of Congress of March
3d 1875, and may be served in the same manner in suits brought
in the United States court ." Molhr & Mokr -DistillingCo. v. Ins.
Go., 12 Fed. Rep. 474, and authorities cited in the note thereto.
These adjudications are conclusive of the question attempted to be
raised in this case. The defendant is duly before the court, and it
only remains to be determined how far, if at all, the complainant
is entitled to relief upon the facts herein stated.
Railroads are potential agencies, constitute a very considerable
part of the national wealth, and deserve to be fully protected in all
their chartered rights. But while they are essential to the continued prosperity and to the further development of the varied
resources of this great country, they are susceptible, when manipulated in the interest of selfish schemes, of being perverted t. the
most unjust and oppressive uses. They necessarily monopolize all
inland carrying business, and if unrestrained can, by unjust discriminations, favor some individuals and communities to the very
serious detriment of others. Hence the frequent efforts made to control them in the interests of individuals and communities. By establishing or abandoning a depot they can depreciate or enhance the
value of private property, and by extending or withholding facilities
increase the profits or inflict losses on all persons engaged in commercial or other pursuits dependent on their favor. An advance
of two cents per bushel on the grain annually carried from the
grain producing west to the eastern cities, with a corresponding
increase upon all other classes of freight, would impose a tax upon
the industry of the country exceeding in amount the annual levies
made by Congress for the support of the national government. If'
permitted, they can so regulate their freight charges as to exact
from each locality dependent upon them the utmost farthing which
the circumstances of each particular case and the absence of wholesome competition enable them to impose. For instance, where
competition is sharp, they can carry passengers and freight over
their entire lines for less than they charge for short intermediate
distances, simply because in the one case they are controlled by
competition, and in the other, in absence of such competition, they
have it in their power to extort the utmost farthing which such
intermediate business is capable of bearing. Those who have them
in charge can organize side or collateral business enterprises and so
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manipulate their roads as to seriously cripple their competitors and
add to their own profits. These are but some of the possibilities
incident to railroad management. Nevertheless, with all their
capacity for injustice, they cannot be dispensed with. But are
their duties and obligations to individuals and to the public to be
measured by the judgment of the interested parties, using them to
further their own selfish schemes, or by the courts ? And if by the
latter, to what extent may the courts go in'supervising their actions
and in restraining abuses ? These are grave questions, which we
will now endeavor to answer.
The great and fundamental principle on which we rest the conclusions hereinafter stated is the conceded fact that railroad corporations are quasi public corporations dedicated to the public use.
It is upon this idea that they have been invested with the power of
eminent domain-the authority to take and appropriate private
property to their use by paying a just compensation therefor.
They have been created for the purpose of exercising the functions
and performing the duties of common carriers. Their duties and
liabilities are defined by law. In accepting their charters they
necessarily accept them with all the duties and liabilities annexed;
that is to say, they undertake to construct the roads contemplated
by their several charters; to keep them in good condition; equip
them with suitable rolling stock and safe machinery; employ skilled
and trustworthy laborers ; provide suitable means of access to and
egress from their trains; erect depots and designate stopping places
wherever the public necessities require them; supply to the extent
of their resources, necessary and adequate facilities for the transaction of all the business offered; deal fairly and impartially with
their patrons; keep pace with improvements in railroad machinery,
and adapt their service to the varying necessities and improved
methods of doing business.
The granting and acceptance of such charter creates a quasi
public trust, and clothes the public with an interest in the use of
railroads, which can be controlled by the public to the extent of the
interest granted therein: Hunn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 126 to 134,
inclusive. But how and by whom can this quasi public trust be
administered ?
The defendant insists that relief cannot be given by this court.
The contention is that all persons injured in their property or persons by the wrongful action or non-action of a railroad corporation
VOL. XXX-92
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can have adequate relief in a court of law by a suit to recover damages for the wrong done, or by mandamus to compel a fulfilment
of its corporate obligations. These remedies undoubtedly exist;
but is there no other and better remedy for the redress of such
wrongs ? Suppose defendant should entirely suspend its operations
and refuse to run trains upon its road, it would be in default, and
everybody injured thereby could sue and recover the specific damages sustained. But is the public without redress, and are the
courts without power to interfere, at the instance of one or more
individuals, and protect the public as well as individuals from the
threatened deprivation of the benefits and advantages intended to
be provided by the building of the road ? Or suppose the defendant should ignore the claims of some populous neiihborhood, whose
business justified and whose necessities required depot accommodations for the receipt and discharge of passengers and freight, and
in this iyay force the people of such locality to transact their business through a depot eight or ten miles distant-is there no redress
except through a multiplicity of suits to be prosecuted at law by
.each injured party, or such relief as could be obtained through the
tardy and inadequate process of mandamus ? These remedies exist.
But they are not the only means of relief. The defendant, by acce'pting its charter, assumed certain obligations in favor of the publie in the nature of a quasi public trust, and the duty of enforcing
the execution of this trust, in the absence of some statute providing
another and different remedy, devolves upon courts of equity. All
matters of confidence and trust are within their peculiar cognizance.
They may restrain or command, remove a trustee and substitute
another in his stead, or execute the trust themselves, as the exigencies of each particular case may require. Their jurisdiction has
been well established and defined. No court, I presume, exercising
equity powers would hesitate, upon proper application, to command
the defendant, in the contingencies supposed, to provide a depot or
operate its road, for the obvious reason that the road was authorized
and built for and dedicated to the public, and the public has a right
to use it; and if the officers representing the corporation were to
refuse to execute the trusts reposed in them, in the particulars mentioned, or in any other respect, it would be the imperative duty of
the courts of equity, on due application, to interfere, and by an
exercise of their extraordinary powers compel a faithful observance
and discharge of all of its obligations. If these courts can lawfully
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do this, their supervising authority over such corporations to the
extent of the public interest in them is vindicated; that is, they
can compel them to keep their roads, rolling stock and machinery
in good condition; force them to establish and maintain depots at
suitable points where the business and public necessities require
them; provide suitable means of access to and egress from their
trains; forbid injurious discriminations; and, to the extent of their
means, supply all the facilities for the safe transmission of persons
and property contemplated by their charters. Their authority to
do this was affirmed and applied in the recent litigation between the
express and the railroad companies, in which the railroad companies
admitted an obligation to receive, carry and deliver express freight,
but contended that they were only bound to do so when the freight
to be carried was delivered into their custody to be carried in the
usual way at their risk and on their fieight trains, to be delivered
by them to the consignees. But every court before which the question was argued held otherwise. 1
In the last of these cases, recently decided by Mr. Justice MILLER and Judge MOCRARY at St. Louis, Missouri, the court ordered
the railroad company, upon a motion for a preliminary injunction
to furnish the express company with suitable freight cars to be attached to its passenger trains for the transportation of its freight in
care of its own messengers, and at the rates fixed by the court,
thus recognising in the fullest possible manner the authority of the
court to supervise and control the action of the railroad company in
the public interest.
Now, if it was competent for the court to thus interfere and control the railroad company in a matter of detail in its business
affairs, why may I not, if the facts of this case justify relief, compel the defendant railroad company to make deliveries of live stock,
consigned to complainant, on the same terms and in the same manner as under like conditions deliveries are made by it to its codefendant ?
The business of receiving, feeding, dealing in and forwarding
live stock is legitimate and necessary. To do so on a scale commensurate with the trade of Cincinnati in that line necessitates
large expenditures in the erection of buildings and equipment of
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suitable yards: and, being both legitimate and useful, everybody
engaging in it is entitled to equal facilities in the use of railroads,
upon which they are largely dependent for success; for it is obvious
if the railroads centering at Cincinnati, or the officials who control
them, are permitted to combine and establish a stock-yard as a
private enterprise, and by contract made it the depot of the roads
for the receipt and delivery of all the stock brought to or carried
through the city, and withhold like accommodations from their competitors, they can suppress competition, and establish and maintain
a monopoly in that particular department of trade, and subject the
public to the payment of undue and unreasonable exactions -for the
services rendered.
I am very clear that no such right exists. Where a railroad
company assumes to receive, take care of, water, feed and forward
stock as a part of its undertaking to transport them, as it may lawfully do, they are at liberty to select such agencies as they may
choose to employ for the purpose, and the exercise of the right is
no wrong to any one else. But that is not the question here. The
complainant does not complain of defendant's transacting its business through its own agents. Its complaint is that the defendant
refuses to deliver stock consigned to his yard to him, except through
the yards of co-defendant, and it is against this unauthorized and
injurious discrimination that he seeks relief. The two yards are
contiguous. Theyare both connected with the Cincinnati & Baltimore Railroad Company's road (over which the defendant is running its trains) by suitable switches. The railroad defendant can
receive stock from and deliver stock to the one as easily as to the
other, but refuses to do so. The discrimination is contrary to a
sound public policy and injurious to the complainant. It gives to
the United Railroad Stock-Yards Company important advantages
in the receipt and shipment of stock, over the @omplainant-an injustice which no railroad company, in the exercise of its quasi
public functions, ought to be permitted to inflict upon any one engaged in a lawful and necessary pursuit. The power to prevent
such an abuse is, as we have already affirmed, vested in courts of
equity until the legislature shall provide another and different
remedy.
A preliminary injunction, corresponding in its scope with the
restraining order heretofore issued, is therefore granted, on complainant's entering into a bond in the penalty of $20,000, with
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securities to be approved and accepted by the clerk, conditioned to
prosecute the suit with effect, or in the event he fails to do so that
he will pay the defendants all such damages respectively sustained
by reason of the wrongful suing out of said injunction.
The complaints against carriers which
are most common in this country are of
railway discriminations in charges. But
the law requires not only that common
carriers charge reasonable rates, but
also that they furnish all persons similarly situated with equal and reasonable
facilities and accommodations for transportation. Both in England and in the
United States this is common law. But
in England it is also a matter of statutory
obligation, and application of the principle of equal and reasonable transportation facilities for all persons similarly
situated has been most frequent in England. The following are instances:
A railway company may be compelled
to run through trains over a continuous
line of railways, where its failure so to
do occasions public inconvenience. So,
if there are two competing companies
having lines from A. to B., and one of
them has a continuation from B. to C.,
and this company arranges the departures
from B. so as to interfere seriously with
the other line, and put the public to inconvenience thereby, and force the traffic
to B. over a greatbr extent of line at a
sacrifice of time or cost, the companies
will be compelled to operate their lines
in connection: Berret v. 0. N. 6- M.
Railroad Co., 1 Nev. & Aac. 38.
Upon complaint by the lessees of a colliery situated on the N. & B. Railway, at
a short distance from its junction with the
M. railway to S., that they were prevented sending the traffic from their colliery to S. by the railways of the two
companies which formed a direct route,
and in consequence had to send it by a
circuitous route, it was proved that the
two railways formed a continuous line of
communication, and that physically there
was no difficulty in the traffic of the col-

liery being carried to S. by the direct
route: Held, That the applicants were
entitled to have their traffic conveyed by
any route they pleased, and to use the
two railways as if they were one continuous line : Victoria C. Co. v. N. 6B. M. Railroad Cos., 3 Nov. & Mac.
35. See, also, James v. Taff Fale, 6-c.,
Railroad Co., 3 Nev. & Alac. 540.
A railway company made an arrangement with W. for the conveyaice of
passengers to and from their station to
the town of K., and admitted his omnibus within the gates of the station, but
refused admittance to the omnibus of Mf.,
which conveyed passengers to and from
the station through the town of K. to
more distant places, to which it was the
only public conveyance. No special
circumstances being shown by the railway company to justify the exclusion of
M.'s omnibus, it was compelled to admit Al.'s omnibus in the same manner.
and to the same extent as it admitted
other vehicles of a similar description :
Marriott v. L. 4 S. W. Railroad Co., 1
Nev. & Mac. 47. But where a railway
company agreed with a cab proprietor,
in consideration of his paying them 6001.
per annum, to allow him the exclusive
liberty of plying for hire within their
station, the court refused to compel the
company to admit another cab proprietor, no inconvenience to the public
being shown to have arisen from the arrangement: Beadell v. Eastern Co.'s
Railroad Co., 1 Nev. & MIac. 56. And
where a railway company granted exclusive permission to a limited number
of fly proprietors to ply for hire within
their station, the court refused to compel the admission of another fly proprietor to the station, although it was
shown that occasional delay and incon-
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renience resulted to the public from the
course pursued: Painter v. L. B. 6- S.
C. Railroad Co., 1 Nav. & Mac. 58.
The principle deducible from the cases
is that there must be a public inconven
ience resulting from the discriminative conduct of thecompany, in order to
warrant the interference of the court.
An injury to one individual merely will
not do.
In Ox/ade v. N. EP.Railroad Co., 15
C. B., N. S. 680 ; 1 Nev. & Mac. 162,
it was decided that there is no obligation on a railway company to carry
goods otherwise than according to their
profession, and that, therefore, it might
restrict its coal traffic to the carriage of
coals for colliery owners from the pit's
mouth to stations, where such colliery
owners have cells or depots appropriated
to them for the reception and sale of
their coals, and to decline to carry coals
from station to station, or for coal merchants-such an arrangement being essential to the regulation of the large
traffic in that article, and the company
not being common carriers of coal.
A railway company having land adjoining one of their stations, let the
whole of it to P., a coal dealer, for the
purpose of storing coal brought by their
line. P. did not require or actually use
the whole of the land for this purpose.
W., another coal dealer, applied to the
company to provide him on similar terms
with land for storing coal, or to let him
the part of the land not actually used by
P. The company refused so to do. W.
then applied for an order to compel the
company to desist from allowing P. to
store coals on the land, or to give similar facilities to him: Held, by BovrLL,
C. J., and KEATING, J., that a means
for storing coal at the station to which
it is sent being necessary for the proper
carrying on of the coal trade, the company had no right to grant greater
facilities to P. than to W., and that they
ought to be restrained from doing so.
Held, by MoNTAGUE SWITH, and BRETT,

JJ., that the Railway and Canal Traffic Act only relates to facilities in the
receiving, forwarding and delivering of
traffic ; that the court has no jurisdiction to interfere with matters not relating
to these ; and that facilities for storing
coal after it has been delivered to the
consignee do not relate to the receiving
forwarding or delivering of traffic, and
are not therefore under the control of the
court" West v. L. 6- N. W. Railroad
.
Co., L.R., 5 C. P 622 ; 39 L. J. C. P.
282; 1 Nev. & Mac. 166. *
A railway company which had been
in the habit of unloading goods conveyed
by them on their railway, by taking them
out of the trucks and placing them in or
adjacent to the wagons of the consigneas,
established a new system, under which
they declined to allow their servants to
unload the goods of C. from their trucks
without extra charge. They, however,
continued to unload the goods of P., as
these, from the smallness of their quantity, were not carried, like the goods of
C., in separate trucks, but were mixed
with the company's own traffic; and it
was therefore for the company's own
convenience that they unloaded them
from the trucks. The court refused to
compel the company to unload the trucks
containing C.'s goods, and to deliver
such goods to C. by placing the same in
or adjacent to his wagons, but it was
intimated that if C. had previously complained to the company of their giving
an advantage to P. over him in so unloading P.'s goods, and the company
bad not removed such ground of complaint, then the court would have interfered : Cooper v. L. 4- S. V. Railroad
Co., 27 L. J.,N. S., C. P. 324;4 .B.
N. S. 738 ; 1 Nev. & Mac. 185.
A railway company, with a view to
compete with other carriers in the collection and carriage of goods, established
receiving offices in various parts of London, from which goods were brought in
vans to the railway station. The gates
of the station were closed against the
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was compelled, by the increase of
its business to separate its mineral
from its goods traffic at 0. station,
and transferred the mineral traffic to
another station, retaining at 0. station only the mineral traffic in favor
of the corporation of 31., who lighted M.
and its suburbs, and whose gas works,
were close to 0. station, communicating
therewith by a siding, so that such traffic
could be removed at once from 0. station without impeding the goods traffic
thereat and it was found as a fact that it
was a matter of public benefit and convenience that the corporation should be
supplied with coal at 0. station; that the
company refused to admit A.'s vans into nature and magnitude of their supplies
their station after 6.30 P. m., but ad- enabled the railway company to make
mitted their own vans and those of B. at such special arrangements for passing
a later hour with parcels, which they them through and out of 0. station, with
forwarded the same night. The time less inconvenience to the general and
(6.30 P. it.) fi.ed by the company as ordinary business thereof than would be
caused by carrying for the applicants,'
that after which they would not receive
goods to be forwarded the same night it was held, that the preference to the
The company in ad- corporation was neither undue nor unwas reasonable.
reasonable.
mitting their own vans later acted bona
fide, and not with the intention of gaining
A railway company permitted a caran undue advantage over other collecting rier (expressman), who also acted as
carriers ; they admitted B.'s vans in superintendent of their goods traffic, to
consequence,of having been enjoined so to
hold himself out as their agent for the
receipt of goods to be carried on their
do. A. sought to compel the company to
admit his vans after 6.30 P. 21., but the line, and nis office as the receiving office
court (Wimrxs and KEATING, J3., dis- of the company, and goods were received
senting) ; Held, that so to admit A.'s
by him at that place, without requiring
the senders to sign conditions which the
vans would interfere with the transport
of traffic, and refused the order asked : company required all other carriers (expressmen) who brought goods to their
Palmer v. L. 6- S. W7. Railroad Co., L.
R., 1 C. P. 588 ; 35 L. J.C. P. 289; 1 station to sign. Held, an undue preferNev. & hMac. 243.
ence; Baxendale v. B. 4- E. Railroad
Co., 11 C. B. N. S. 787; 1 Nev. 1
Lees v. L. 4- Y. Railroad Co., I Nev.
& Mac. 352, lays down the general proMlac. 229.
A railway company which employed
position that, in determining whether a
agents for delivering in a large town
preference shown by a railway company
to one of its customers is reasonable or goods brought by the railway to the
unreasonable, regard should be had as parties to whom they were addressed,
well to the general convenience of the arranged within the station the goods to
railway company with reference to its be delivered by these agents and afforded
general traffic as to the benefit and con- to them other facilities in the use of the
venience of the public.
station. Held, that the company were
Therefore, where a railway company
not compellable to give other carriers,
vans of the complainants and other carriers at 6.30 r. me., but the company's
own vans were admitted at a much later
hour, and the goods brought by them
were forwarded by the same night's
trains. Reld, an undue prejudice to complainant: Palmer v. L. 4- S. C. Railroad
Co., L. R., 6 C.P. 194; 40 L.J.C. P.
331 ; 1 Nev. & Mane. 271 ; see also, Garton
v. B. 4- B. Railroad Co., 6 C. B. N. S.
639; 28 L. J. 0. P. 306; 1 Nev. &
Blac. 218; Baxendale v. L. 4- S. WY.
Railroad Co., 12 0. B. N. S. 758; 1
Nev. & MTac. 231.
But where A. collected parcels and
forwarded them by railway ; the railway
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to whom the goods were sent for delivery to the ultimate consignees, the same
privileges in the use of the station: Pickford v. Caledonian Railroad Co., 4 Sess.
Ca., 3d Ser. 755; 1 Nev. 1 Mac. 252.
In lAnes v. L., B. 4- S. C. Railroad
Co., 2 Nev. & Mac. 155, the railway
company were given a month in which
to provide a station on the road with
additional train accommodations and
required to book traffic through to London. See, also, Local Board v. L., B.
4- S. C. Railroad Co., 2 Nev. & Mac.
214.
In The South Eastern Railroad Co., v.
Railway Com. 4- Corp. of Hastings, 3
Nev. & Mac. 464 ; Q. B. D. 586; 50
L. J., Q. B. D. 201, the railway commissioners required the company to extend the platform accommodation at H.,
according to a specified plan to cover
over the platforms and part of the carriage yard, to add four waiting rooms of
a specified size, to reserve a portion of
the station for refreshments, to increase
the accommodations for the delivery of
tickets, and to increase and improve the
accommodation for cattle.
With respect to the station at L.,
the order of the commissioners required
the company to increase and improve the
platform and waiting room accommodations, to cover over the bridge, to make
fresh openings into and to widen the
road of approach to that station.
Held, by the Court of Appeal (reversing the judgment of the Queen's Bench
Division), that these matters were within
the jurisdiction of the commissioners,
but that they had no power peremptorily
to order the execution of works according to a specified plan. The general
principle was asserted that the commissioners had power to order the company
to provide reasonable facilities, but not
power to specify particular improvements and plans therefor and to require
the company to adopt them. It was
asserted that the commissioners had no
power to interfere with the discretion of

the company in regard to the mode of
furnishing reasonable facilities.
Lords S-LBORNE

and COLEIDonE

held that the orders with respect to the
platforms and goods yard at H., and the
approach road at L., were in excess of
jurisdiction ; that the orders as to refreshment accommodation and the covering over of platforms, carriage yard and
bridge, did not relate to "facilities,"
but that the orders as to booking office,
waiting room, and catte accommodations, were, as to "facilities," within
the meaning of the statute.
BRET, L. J., held that all the orders
except those relating to cattle accommodation and the delivery of tickets at the
booking office were in excess of jurisdiction.
In Local Board v. N.

E. Railroad

Co., 3 Nev. & Mac. 306, the inhabitants
of the district of N., which was intersected by a line of railway, complained
of there being no station in the district,
and it was proved that there was no station nearer than at A. on the one side,
and the terminal station of H. on the
other, the distance from A. to H. being
about 4J miles; that the railway company possessed unoccupied lands in such
district, upon part of which they had
placed a siding for the delivery of coal,
and that there would be no physical -or
engineering difficulty in using part of
such land for the establishment of a station at which traffic of all kinds could be
handled.
It was decided that the number of
passengers would be so few from such
proposed station that the inconvenience
to the company and the travelling public
would greatly exceed the inconvenience
occasioned the few who were compelled
to go to A. or H. to take the train.
Therefore the court refused to compel
the company to put up a station at N. ;
but the company were required to provide siding accommodations reasonably
sufficient
for the receipt and delivery in
N. of the station to station traffic of the
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district, and to give such a service for
the delivery of inward traffici the district, and the removal therefrom of outward traffic as was given under corresponding circumstances to other places.
See, also, S. TV. Railroad Co. v. Staines
Railroad Co., 3 Nev. & Mac. 48.
A railway company give only a reasonable facility in running over a foreign
line (for example, a shipper's private
switches) to collect traffic, properly placed
for that purpose, where such line or
switches have been properly planned to
give the company access to them, and
where it has no such line of its own :
W1atkinson v. Wrexham, 6-c., Railroad
Co., No. 1, 3 Nev. & Mac. 5.
As to the obligation of a lessee company to provide cars on the leased line
and use private sidings thereof: see
Watldnson v. Wrexham, 4.c., Railroad
Co., No. 2, 3 Nev. & Mac. 164.
In Watldnson v. Wrexham, 6.c., Railroad Co., No. 3, 3 Nov. & Mac. 446, the
company were prohibited from delaying
empty coal trucks on their way to the
collieries ; were required promptly to haul
loaded coal trucks from the collieries, and
to provide sufficient locomotive power to
do so. It was queried whether the weighing of coal was a "facility," the company could be compelled to furnish. As to
supply of wagons, see, also, Tharsis, S.
4- C. Co. v. L. 6- N. W. Railroad Co.,
3 Nov. & Mfac. 455.
A railway company are not required
to furnish booking offices for traffic, at
places off their railvay nor to arrange for
the conveyance, by road, of goods between such places to the nearest station
on their railway: D. 6- M. Railroad Co.
v. f. G. W. Railroad Co., 3 Nev. &
fac. 379.
A railway company delivered minerals
at T. station, but refused to deliver their
damageable traffic consigned to the applicant, and delivered such traffic at L.,
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one mile and a half from T., which was
their general goods station for T.
The accommodation at T. station
being insufficient to receive all the T.
goods traffic, and the railroad company
having no power to enlarge it, Hdd,
that the applicant was not entitled to
have damageable goods delivered at that
station. Semble, if the accommodation at
T. station had been sufficient to receive
all traffic similarly sent, the company
would have been ordered to deliver damageable goods to the applicant at T. station : Thombs v. N. S. Railroad Co., 3
Nav. & Mac. 1.
The C. company were bound to give
to-the Scottish East coast traffic of the N.
B. Ry. Co. using their railway all usual
facilities, including so far as might be
reasonably required, through carriages,
and also any greater facilities which they
might grant to any other company in
respect to such traffic or of any traffic
competitive with it. The C. company
ran for the convenience of traffic competitive with the Scottish East coast
traffic of the N. B. Company, in one case
a saloon sleeping carriage, weighing
three tons, and fitted to carry twelve
persons, and in another a composite carriage, of which one compartment had
sleeping berths for three persons: Hdd,
that a Pullman car, weighing twenty-one
tons, and to hold twenty-two persons,
was so dissimilar in character, both to
the saloon and composite carriages, that
the N. B. company were not entitled under the above provisions to insist on the
forwarding of it by the C. company as a
similar facility, nor as a reasonable requirement, unless the N. B. company
guaranteed to the C. company a mileage
proportion on eight fares: Caledonian v.
North BritishRailroad Co., No. 3, 3 Nev.
& Mac. 56.
ADELBERT HAMILTON.
Chicago.

COOPER v. LOUAINSTEIN.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.
COOPER v. LOUANSTEIN.
A. owning an unimproved lot over which projected, to the extent of a foot, the
eaves of an adjoining house owned by B., conveyed to B. by a deed in the execution of which B. did not join, the strip of land one foot wide so overhung. The
deed stipulated that it was made and accepted upon thepexpress condition and reservation that A. and his heirs, or whoever might own, A.'s said lot, should have the
right of building up to the line of said lot thereby conveyed, and of having two
windows looking out on said lot,"I which windows shall not be hindered or obstructed
in any way by said B., his heirs or assigns, to any other or greater extent than such
windows if so erected could be obstructed by the house of B., at present standing on his
said lot." On a bill to enjoin B. from extending his house over his front yard adjoining A.'s lot, Hed, that the deed did not entitle A. to have the whole of B.'s front
yard as it then existed, unobstructed by buildings, for the benefit of A.'s windows,
but only the strip of land one foot in width conveyed by the deed.
Per BEASLFY, 0. J.-A deed not executed by the grantee but accepted by him,
containing a grant of an easement in lands of the grantee, such lands not being
passed to him by the conveyance, is not to be regarded with respect to the grant of
such easement as the deed of the grantee.

THIS was an appeal from a decree advised by a special master
and based upon the following facts:
The complainant's grantor, William J. Cooper, and the defendant, were in 1870 owners of adjoining lots on Market street, in
Morristown. On the defendant's lot stood a dwelling about eleven
feet back from the street. Cooper being about to erect a building
on his lot, discovered that the eaves of defendant's house projected
over the division line, and thereupon an arrangement was made
between him and the defendant in fulfilment of which he, for a cash
consideration of $100, conveyed to the defendant in fee a strip of
ground one foot wide along the dividing line, the deed therefor
containing the following clause:
"1This deed is made and accepted upon this express condition
and reservation that the said William J. Cooper, and his heirs, or
whosoever may at any time hereafter own the adjoining land of said
Cooper, shall have the full right, liberty aid privilege of building
up to the line of the lot hereby conveyed and of having and enjoying two windows, one on the first story and one on the second story
in the side of such building as he or they may put up, looking out
upon said lot, which windows shall not be hindered or obstructed in
any way by said Louanstein or his heirs or assigns to any other or
greater extent than such windows if now erected could be obstructed

COOPER v.LOUANSTEIN.

by the house of said Louanstein at present standing on his said
lot."
I Cooper then erected a brick building upon his
lot, extending to
the street line in front and to the newly-constituted division line on
the side toward the defendant, and in that side placed a window in
the'second story, near the front, overlooking the defendant's front
yard. In January 1882, the defendant began the erection of an
addition to his house, extending to the front of his lot and to the
old division line between him and Cooper, and being of a height
sufficient to obstruct the view from the window before mentioned.
The complainant's bill was filed to enjoin such obstruction.
Mr. .fenry C. Pitney, for appellant.
Mr. Alfred Xills and Mr. B. Gummere, for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DIXON, J.-Under the view which we have adopted in this case,
no other question need be decided than that of the true meaning
of the clause upon which the complainant relies for the maintenance
of her suit. She contends that by the "condition and reservation"
in the deed from her grantor to the defendant, she has a right to
have her window unobstructed by any erection on the defendant's
lot save the building which stood there when the deed was made.
This claim, if maintained, practically deprives the defendant of the
use of the front part of his lot except for the purposes of a yard.
In view of the facts that in purchasing the one-foot strip, he was
protecting only the eaves of his house, and that he paid in cash the
full value of the land he bought, it is plain that the claim is one
which a prioriwould be thought not likely to accord with the intention of the defendant. These circumstances may legitimately
be regarded as throwing light upon the language of the written
instrument, for the court is called upon to put itself in the
position of the parties and to avoid, if it fairly can, any interpretation of their words and acts which will lead to an unreasonable result.
Turning, then, to the language of the clause, we see that the
rights which Cooper affirmatively reserved were : 1st, that of building up to the line of the lot conveyed, viz., the one-foot strip ;
2d, that of having two windows in the side of his building, looking out upon said lot; and then was added a negative sentence as
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to the obstruction of these windows. Of these affirmative reservations, the right of building up to the line of the lot conveyed and
the right of having two windows in the side of his building, were
such as would have belonged to Cooper without being expressly
preserved, and the only important words to be found are the phrase
"looking out upon said lot." This it is that gives charac ter and
scope to the right which the parties intended to secure. There
can be no question of the meaning of this phrase; "said lot" is
the one-foot strip, just before mentioned, and therefore the windows
which Cooper reserved the right to have and enjoy were windows
looking out upon the one-foot strip. If the entire clause of the
deed stopped here, no reasonable doubt could be raised about its
interpretation. It would clearly import that the strip, and the strip
only, was to be kept open for the use of the windows; an exami
nation of the remainder of the clause does not, I think disclose any
different purpose. It in effect forbids Louanstein to create any new
obstruction to the windows, and permits him to maintain whatever
obstruction his old building interposed. But in determining the
extent of this prohibition, we are to bear in mind that the significant feature of. the windows protected is that they are windows looking out upon the one-foot strip, and hence it is quite
reasonable to conclude that this outlook constitutes the measure
of the prohibition. In accord with the same notion is the permission to maintain the old obstruction, for, as the house then
standing on the defendant's lot overlapped a portion of this
strip, he would have been required to remove this projection,
unless this permission had been added to qualify the right before
reserved.
My conclusion, therefore, is that by this deed the parties designed
to vest in Louanstein the fee of this one-foot strip, and to reserve
to Cooper and his heirs and assigns a right to the use of said strip
for his two windows, except so far as such use was already impaired
by the house then standing on defendant's lot.
An additional circumstance favoring this conclusion is found in
the fact that the grantor in this deed denominated the retention of
his right a "reservation," a sufficiently apt, term, if applied to
something which he might otherwise have been thought to be surrendering, a totally inapt term, if applied to something which he
was then for the first time seeking to acquire.
The chancellor's decree dismissing the complainant's bill should
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be affirmed, on the ground that the complainant is not entitled to
the right which she sets up.
BEASLEY, 0. J.-The question before the court does not, in my
opinion, depend on the construction of a written contract, for the
conveyance from Cooper to Louanstein is not regarded by me, with
respect to the subject of the easement in controversy, as the deed
of the latter. In point of fact that instrument was not executed
by him, and, touching the point in dispute, it is not to be attributed
to him as a matter of law. As I understand the authorities, none
of them lend any countenance whatever to such an attribution, and
they can be made to wear such a semblance only by failing to discriminate between the facts to which such authorities properly apply
and the facts involved in the present case.
The inquiry before the court relates to the grant of an easement
by force of a deed not actually executed by the grantee, in lands
of the grantee, and which are not, either in whole or in part, transferred by the conveyance. The case is the same as though A.
should convey to B. a tract of land situated in the city of Trenton,
and should insert in such conveyance the grant of a right of way
over the lands of B., located in Princeton. The question is, by the
acceptance of such a deed, is it the deed of B. with respect to the
transfer of the right of way ? To this query I answer unhesitatingly in the negative.
And in the first place it should be noted that if the instrument
in the case suggested, and in the one before the court, is to be taken
as the deed of the grantee, still it is indisputable that resting on
its own footing alone, it would be unenforceable against him, either
at law or in equity. This is the effect of the Statute of Frauds,
which requires the signature of the person desirous of passing such
an interest in his land. So that if we were to adopt the theory
which is rejected by me, we would have the anomaly presented of
a deed of a party being utterly ineffectual for the purpose for which
it was designed. It would be styled a grant, but nothing in point
of law or of fact would pass under it. If the complainant in the
present case had'not set forth in his bill acts of part performance
of the agreement for this easement, which he asserts is contained
in this attributed deed, he would have exhibited a case without any
legal or equitable basis; and to such a case the ascription of the
deed to the defendant is not a necessity, for if the agreement in

742

COOPER

v.

LOUANSTEIN.

question had been by parol it would have been, under the alleged
facts, quite as efficacious as though it were under seal. The technical doctrine, therefore, which has in some instances the effect of
attributing a deed as the act of a person who never signed or sealed
it, is by no means essential or beneficial to the equitable disposition
of the class of cases to which the present one belongs, nor indeed
to any class of cases that can be imagined.
The principles on which the decisions rest, which ascribe a deed
to a non-executing grantee, do not warrant their application to the
present case. Such decisions relate to stipulations on the part of
the grantee, which are connected with or relate to the land
embraced in the conveyance. Covenants contained in such instruments, which have been declared to be binding, have universally
been of this character. Such agreements may indeed be collateral
to the conveyance, but they must relate to the premises whose title
is transferred. This was the condition of things in Finley v. Simpson, 2 Zab. 311, for in that instance the covenant ascribed, as a
matter of law, to the grantee, was that he would pay off the money
which was secured by a mortgage on the land granted. It is, I
think, very plain that if the moneys in question had not been a
burthen on the land, the statement of the assumption of the debt
by the non-executing grantee contained in the deed of the grantor
would not have been imputed to the former as his covenant. And
yet that, in effect, is what is claimed on the side of the complainant
in the present case. Such a doctrine is not supported by the decision just quoted, nor by any of the authorities which form its
foundation. I have examined all those authorities, and I find that,
without exception, they relate to covenants connected with the
premises demised or conveyed. Not one of them indicates the
doctrine that a statement of an agreement touching alien lands will
be imputed to the grantee. Among such authorities the leading
one is the case cited from the year-books, 38 Edw. III., c. 8, 9.
The facts involved were these: a demise was made to two lessees,
only one of whom executed the counterpart of the lease, but both
went into possession. The lease contained a covenant, on the
part of the lessees, to pay 201. if certain conditions were not complied with. The court decided that the instrument was the deed
of both lessees. But the conditions referred to all related to the
land demised, and consequently such judgment was a proper basis
for the decision in Finley v. Simpson, but will afford no basis for
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the decision of the present case. Nieither Sir EDWARD CoKE nor
Chief-Baron CoyNs, nor any other legal writer, intimates any
opinion that the technical rule in question can be carried any further than it was in this case from the year-books. In Sheppard's
Touchstone, vol. 1, p. 177, the law on this head i- stated with exactness. This learned writer says: "If a feoffment or a lease be
made to two, or to a man and his wife, and there are divers covenants in the deed to be performed on the part of the lessees, and
one of them doth not seal, or.the wife doth or doth not seal during
coverture, and he or she that doth not seal doth notwithstanding
accept of the estate and occupy the lands conveyed or demised ; in
these cases, as touching all inherent covenants, as for payment of
rent and the accessories thereof, or clauses of distress, or re-entry,
nomine pcenc, reparations and the like, they are bound by these
covenants as if they did seal the deed." Both this distinguished
author and Lord Cox expressly declare that the root of this legal
rule is in the maxim: Qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus,
et transit terra cum onere-that is, that he who takes the land
conveyed or demised must take it with the burthen upon it. It is
obvious that this maxim cannot be applied to the case before the
court. If covenants relating to alien lands are to be construed
as the agreements by specialty of a non-executing grantee, it would
follow that any other stipulation which the grantor might insert in
his conveyance would be so regarded. Thus the grantee might in
such form be made to convey his lands, or to sell a ship or a stock
of goods. It seems to me that a rule of law of this kind would
be fraught with mischief. If a grantor wishes to obtain a conveyance of lands from his grantee, or wishes to obtain an easement in
such lands, it is the reasonable and safe course to require him to
obtain a deed to that end, executed by such grantee. The law
gives a peculiar efficacy to deeds, on the ground that the act of
signing, sealing and delivering such instruments denotes caution
and deliberation in the person executing them. It would be an
unwise policy to introduce into the law, instruments having such
efficacy which have not been, in their formation, attended with such
formalities.
My footing, therefore, in the present matter is this: I do not
regard the clause relating to the easement in question, as contained in a deed of the defendant, Louanstein; but I regard such
statement, the deed *being accepted by Louanstein, as a circum-
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stance of evidence, more or less strong, as the case may be, tending to show a petrol agreement for such easement. If this were
the deed of the defendant it could not be contradicted or altered
by extraneous evidence; it would have to speak for itself, and all
that this court could do would be to enforce its terms. This is the
force that I refuse to give to it, looking upon it as simply evidence
of a character susceptible of explanation or alteration by the other
facts in the case. If there were no other proof on this subject
except the statement of the bargain in the grantor's deed, I should
treat it as was done in the case cited from the New York reports,
as full proof of an agreement in the terms of such statement, and,
as the transaction has in part been executed, should favor its
enforcement. But the matter does not stand on such statement
alone; there is other testimony on the subject that has satisfied
me that the easement, as claimed by the complainant, was not a
part of the bargain. The defendant did not agree to grant the
easement to the extent set up in the complainant's bill. Taking
this view of the testimony, I will vote, on that ground, to affirm
this decree.
DEPUE,

J., delivered a dissenting opinion.

A covenant or stipulation inserted in
a deed-poll binds the grantee, his heirs
and assigns, where such stipulation directly relates to the premises conveyed :
Stinesv. Dorman, 25 Ohio St. 580; Clark
v. Mfartin, 49 Penn. St. 289; Seymour
v. McDonald, 4 Sandf. Ch. 502; Atlantic Dock Co. v. Leavitt, 50 Barb. 135,
54 N. Y. 35 ; Anon., 2 Abb. N. C. 56 ;
Kimpton v. Walker, 9 Vt. 191 ; and also
where it relates to the premises conveyed
and the adjoining premises, as a fence:
Kellogg v. Robinson, 6 Vt. 276; Burbank v. Pillsbury, 48 N. H. 475 ; Harri,nan v. Park, 55 Id. 471 ; Nvewell v.
Hill, 2 Met. (Mass.) 180; Bronson v.
Coffin, ]08 Mass. 175; 118 Id. 156;
Blain v. Taylor, 19 Abb. Pr. 228; Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488 ; Easter v.
Little Afiami Riailroad Co., 14 Ohio St.
48; Boyle v. Tamlyn, 6 B. & C. 329;
Walsh v. Barton, 24 Ohio St. 28; Dun/y
v. N. Y. 4. H. Railroad Co., 2 Hilt. 496.

But see Emerson v. Simpson, 43 N. H.
475; Parish v. Whitney, 3 Gray 516;
or party wall, Maine v. Cumston, 98
Mass. 317 ; Burlock v. Peck, 2 Duer 90;
but see Scott v. $XcMillan,76 N. Y. 141;
Bloch v. Isham, 28 Ind. 37.
Unless building restrictions, &c., appear to have been inserted for the benefit
of adjacent lands, they are merely personal, and do not run with the land:
Skinner v. Shepard, 130 Mass. 180;
Piercev. Keator, 9 ]Hun 532, 70 N. Y.
419; Goddard on Eas. (Bennet's ed.)
367, note; Wagner v. Hanna, 38 Cal.
111; Keates v. Lyon, L. R., 4 Ch. App.
218; Renals v. Cowlishaw, L. R., 9 Ch.
Div. 125; 11 Id. 866 ; Thurston v.
Minke, 32 Md. 487; see Peck v. Conway, 119 Mass. 546; Herrick v. M31arshall, 66 le. 435 ; Badger v. Boardman,
16 Gray 559.
In Athey v. McHenry, 6 B. Mon. 50,
A. was the owner of a house adjoining on
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the north a vacant lot thirty feet wide
and two hundred feet deep. The house
projected slightly over the line of the
vacant lot, and had a door and several
windows opening thereon.
L. had contracted to buy the vacant lot, and also
another one beyond and adjoining it, but
agreed, through his agent, that the owner
of the thirty feet might sell ten feet
thereof to A., next to A.'s lot, on condition, as alleged," that it was to be forever left open and not further built
upon," in order that "it should remain
forever an open space between A.'s
house and the house which M. was about
to build, to afford air and light to both."
The deed was executed and delivered,
but contained no restrictions whatevera fact that l. did not discover until some
time afterwards. MI. built his house
adjoining the south line of the ten-feet
strip, and A. afterwards built a coalhouse on the back part of the strip, and
also nailed up boards near and in front
of M.'s windows on the north side of
M.'s house, so as to cover them and exclude the light and air therefrom. MI.
filed a bill to correct A.'s deed byinsertiug the above-quoted stipulation, and to
compel A. to remove the coal-house, and
also the boards which darkened the windows, and to prevent any further erections on said strip. Held, that the circumstances of the transfer of the strip,
the relative positions of the parties, and
their motives and acts before and after
the strip was sold, could be inquired
into; and the deed was ordered to be
reformed so as to con~hin a clause preventing A.'s building on the strip only as
far back as the houses stood, and requiring him to remove the boards, but not
the coal-house.
In Woodruff v. Trenton Water Power
Co., 2 Stock. 489, a corporation stipulated in a deed of lands to them for a
raceway, that they would erect and maintain a bridge across their raceway, and
also a landing-place on the Delaware
river on other lands of the grantor, and
VoL. XXI.-94

all necessary fences, and that the grantor
might use the raceway to water his cattle
and to take ice therefrom, the premises
to revert in case of breach. Held, that
the covenants ran with the land and were
enforceable by the heir of the grantor
against the successors of the grantees,
but that equity could not compel specific
performance because the complainant
could, by the terms of the deed, enforce
the forfeiture of the estate at pleasure
See 1Rgau v. Locdhart, I Pug. (N. B.)
127.
In Cooke v. C'hilcott, L. R., 3 Oh. Div.
694, a purchaser of a piece of land,-with
a well or spring upon it, covenanted
with the vendor, who retained land adjoining to be disposed of for building
sites, to erect a pump and reservoir, and
to supply water therefrom to all houses
built on vendor's other land. Held, a
covenant running with the land, and enforceable by the purchaser of one of
original vendor's lots against the vendee
of the original purchaser. [This case
was questioned in Haywood v. Brunswick
Build. Soc., L. R., 8 Q. B. D. 403.1
In Daniel v. Stepney, L. R., 9 Exch.
185, a power of distress in a demise of
mines over "any lands in which there
shall be, for the time being, any pits or
openings by or through which the coal or
culm by the said deed demised shall, for
the time being, be in course of working
by the lessees, their executors, administrators and assigns, was held to authorize, as against the assignees of the lessees, with notice, a distress at pits not
included in the demise, but referred to iii
it, and then worked by the lessees.
In Cat v. Tourle, L. R., 4 Ch. App.
654, the plaintiff sold a piece of land to
a society which covenanted with him that
he, his heirs and assigns, should have the
exclusive right of supplying beer to any
public house erected on the land, but the
plaintiff entered into no covenant to supply it. Held, that plaintiff could enjoin
the defendant, who had purchased part
of the land and erected a public house
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thereon, from

supplying such *public

house with his own beer.
In Luker v. Dennis, L. R., 7 Ch.Div.
227, a brewer leased a public house to a
publican who, in the lease, covenanted
for himself, his representatives and assigns, to purchase from the lessor all the
beer consumed at that public house, and
also at another public house of which the
publican held a lease under another landlord. Held, that the latter covenant was
binding in equity, upon an assignee of
the lease of the second public house, who
had notice of the covenant.
In Biggar v. Allen, 15 Grant's Ch.
358, the plaintiff claimed under a grantee to whom had been conveyed a lot
bordering on a lane leading to the grantor's dwelling. On this lot the original
grantee had built a hotel with windows
looking out on the lane, under the verbal
assurance of the grantor that the lane
should not be built upon opposite the
Held, that plaintiff
adjacent houses.
could enjoin the grantor's widow from
building on the lane so as to close the
windows of his hotel.
In Rockford lailroadCo.v. Beclemeire,
72 Ill. 267, the natural and proximate
loss (such as -inconvenience in shipping
grain) to the grantor in a deed-poll,
from the grantees' failure to comply with
a provision in the deed which required
them to erect a depot " upon the section
of land" on which the grantor's farm
was situated, was held recoverable, but
not speculative damages.
In Morse v. Copeland, 2 Gray 302, in
1825, the Copelands, still owning other
adjacent lands, conveyed their interest
in a factory and water privilege to the
Easton company, together with the right
to flow all their (Copelands') lands as
then flowed; and the Easton company
conveyed the same to Leach, through
whom the plaintiff claims.
In 1831,
Leach gave the Copelands an oral license
to erect a dam on their own land to exclude the water therefrom, which they

In
did, and it remained until 1853.
1831, Leach also gave the Copelands an
oral license to dig a ditch across his
(Leach's) lands (now owned by the
plaintiffs) to drain whatever water might
accumulate on their land in consequence
of having erected their dam. The ditch
was dug and continued by them until
1853, when the plaintiffs gave the defendants (the present owners of the Copelands' lands not conveyed to the Easton
company) a written notice to discontinue
the ditch and to remove the dam, and
Held,
revoking the license therefor.
that he could revoke the license as to the
ditch, even after twenty years, but not
as to the dam. See Biting v. Clinton
Mills Co., 36 Conn. 296 ; Williamson v.
ingling, 80 Ind. 379 ; Carrv. Lowry,
27 Penn. St. 257 ; Goddard on Ease.
(Bonnet's ed.) 472 ct seq.; .Tunction Railroad Co. v. Sayres, 28 Ind. 318.
Wooliscroft v. Norton, 15 Wis. 198,
the owners of a dam and several mill
sites, conveyed one of those sites to
Stevens & Older, by a deed covenanting
that the grantees would pay their ratable share of the expenses of keeping in
repair the dam and raceway not on their
lands. Held, binding on Stevens &
Older's grantees. See Spensley v.Valentine, 34 Wis. 154.

In McLean v. McKay, L. R., 5 P. C.
327, a grantor conveyed a tract of land
leaving a vacant lot belonging to the
grantor between the lot on which his own
house stood and the lot conveyed. The
deed contained a clause that, "by the
true intent which was unanimously
agreed upon between the parties [the
vacant lot] should never be hereafter
sold, but left for the common benefit of
both parties, their successors," &c. Beld,
that the grantee's vendee could compel
the guardian of the grantor's heir, who
represented the deceased grantor, to remove a building erected by him on the
vacant lot. Also, Brew v. Van Deman,
6 Heisk. 433; Phctnix Ins. Co. v. Con-

